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Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? 
A Historical Perspective 
CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS 
The motivation and structure of various banking insurance experiments in U.S. 
history are analyzed, along with their political alternative, branch banks. In both 
the antebellum period and in the 1920s, insurance systems that relied on 
self-regulation, made credible by mutual liability, were successful, while compul- 
sory state systems were not. Branch banking increased stability and resiliency to 
shocks. 
Following the current savings and loan collapse, recent studies of 
deposit insurance funds have focused on the perverse incentives 
created by deposit insurance when it is not fairly priced. Insurance 
encourages excess risk-taking by existing banks-particularly if prior 
losses leave them with little capital to lose from pursuing long shots- 
and allows unscrupulous, or simply inexperienced, entrepreneurs to 
enter banking as a means to finance their risky enterprises. The 
discipline of the market, which normally would prevent such interme- 
diaries from having access to funds, is removed by insurance. Deposi- 
tors of insured institutions have little incentive to discriminate with 
respect to where and with whom they place their funds. 
Careful studies of the recent federal- and state-insured thrift experi- 
ences by Edward Kane, Paul Horvitz, and others, add credence to the 
view that insurance itself can be destabilizing.1 For example, bad initial 
realizations on investments were translated into a thrift and bank 
debacle in Texas because they were combined with high initial leverage 
and increased risk-taking by troubled institutions which responded to 
the initial adverse shocks by aggressively entering the speculative real 
estate loan market. Depositors presumably tolerated high leverage and 
increased risk-taking more than they would have had they not been 
insured. By promoting excessive leverage and increased risk-taking, 
deposit insurance made a bad situation much worse. The lack of 
political will by Congress and regulators to close insolvent institutions 
prolonged the "desperation" risk-taking and further magnified losses to 
the insurance funds. 
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. L, No. 2 (June 1990). X The Economic History 
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507. 
The author is Assistant Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, 
and a member of the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 230 S. La Salle St., 
Chicago, IL 60604. 
1 See Edward J. Kane, "How Incentive-Incompatible Deposit-Insurance Funds Fail," mimeo- 
graph, Ohio State University, 1988; and Paul M. Horvitz, "The Causes of Texas Bank and Thrift 
Failures," mimeograph, University of Houston, 1989. 
283 
284 Calomiris 
Renewed discussion of the purpose and proper structure of deposit 
insurance has focused attention on the history of financial intermedia- 
ries and their regulation. U.S. financial history contains the answers to 
three fundamental questions of interest to would-be reformers. Why 
was bank liability insurance created in the first place? What evidence 
supports this presumed "special" need of banks? Which experiments 
with insurance were most successful, and which aspects of these 
experiments account for the accomplishment of legitimate goals? 
The answer to the first question is similar across various historical 
instances-bank insurance was instituted to protect the economy's 
payments system from financial panics.2 Recent theoretical work on 
banking echoes this theme. Banks are especially vulnerable because 
they offer short-term (typically demandable) claims backed by longer- 
term assets whose value is not easily observable to depositors.3 Thus 
banks are vulnerable to panics induced by depositors' uncertainty about 
the value of their portfolios. Disturbances that increase the probability 
of insolvency of some class of bank borrowers-even if they are small 
relative to aggregate bank assets and concentrated in only a few 
banks-can provoke widespread disintermediation from all banks by 
depositors who lack information about the incidence or degree of the 
shock. 
The social costs of such disturbances are high because banks provide 
a unique source of transacting balances and commercial credit to 
"information-intensive" borrowers. Disruptions of banking disrupt all 
industries' abilities to transact and operate effectively. Not surprisingly, 
it was this concern for the viability of the economy's payments system 
(the availability of liquidity and trade credit) that prompted insurance 
plans, starting with that of New York in 1829, and culminating in the 
federal system of the 1930s.4 
Bank insurance was not exclusively the domain of the government 
historically. The information externality created by depositors' confu- 
sion about the precise incidence across banks of a given shock prompted 
private coinsurance among banks to reduce the potential for disinter- 
mediation and to coordinate the banking system's response to such 
crises when they did occur. Formal coinsurance arrangements among 
2 See Carter H. Golembe, "The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of its 
Antecedants and its Purposes," Political Science Quarterly (June 1960), pp. 189-95, and Eugene 
N. White, "The Political Economy of Bank Regulation," this JOURNAL, 42 (Mar. 1982), pp. 33-42. 
3The rationale behind this peculiar contracting structure is not at all obvious. For a critique of 
existing explanations and a new approach to this question, see Charles W. Calomiris and Charles 
M. Kahn, "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," 
mimeograph, Northwestern University, 1989. 
4 The desire to insure wealth per se was not the primary motivation of bank insurance (see 
Golembe, "Deposit Insurance Legislation," pp. 189-95); rather, it was the desire to preserve 
liquidity. This explains why intermediaries other than banks (insurance companies, pension funds, 
and so forth) have not given rise to similar legislation. 
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bank clearinghouse members, and less formal arrangements among 
other banks-especially in the branch-banking states of the antebellum 
South-provided many of the features of government deposit insur- 
ance.5 In these private insurance regimes banks agreed to make markets 
in each other's liabilities, to make interbank loans, and to coordinate 
suspensions and resumptions of convertibility to minimize disruptions 
during panics. In all cases, self-imposed regulations and mutual moni- 
toring kept members of the privately established coalitions from "free 
riding" on the collective insurance. 
It is important to note that unit banking laws (prohibitions of branch 
banking) increased the potential for such disturbances, and hampered 
banks' abilities to respond to them effectively. First, the confusion over 
the incidence of small shocks is accentuated in a system of many small 
banks, which makes runs more likely. Second, banks' abilities to 
coordinate behavior and coinsure depended on ease of communication 
and mutual monitoring (to prevent free riding), and these were ham- 
pered in systems of many, geographically isolated banks. Indeed, these 
barriers to private coinsurance explain why clearinghouse membership 
typically was limited to individual cities. 
Historians long have stressed the destabilizing influence of unit 
banking and linked its peculiar prevalence in the United States to the 
unique vulnerability of U.S. banking historically.6 Indeed, studies of the 
political history of deposit insurance legislation show that it was the 
desire to preserve unit banking, and the political influence of unit 
bankers, that gave rise to the perceived need for deposit insurance, both 
in the antebellum period and in the twentieth century.7 It was under- 
stood early on (through observing the successful operation of branch 
banks in the South and in other countries) that branching-with its 
benefits both of greater diversification and coordination-provided an 
alternative stabilizer to liability insurance. But unit banks and their 
supporters successfully directed the movement for banking reform 
5 For discussions of clearinghouse coinsurance, see James G. Cannon, Clearing Houses, 
(Washington, DC, 1910), and Gary Gorton "Clearing Houses and the Origin of Central Banking in 
the United States," this JOURNAL, 46 (June 1986). For a summary of similar operations in the 
branching antebellum South, see Thomas Govan, "The Banking and Credit System in Georgia" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1936), and Charles W. Calomiris and Larry Schweikart, 
"The Panic of 1857: Origins and Regional Responses," mimeograph, 1989. 
6 See, for example, Oliver M. W. Sprague, History of Crises Under the National Banking 
System (Washington, DC, 1910); Gaines T. Cartinhour, Branch, Group, and Chain Banking (New 
York, 1931); John M. Chapman and Ray B. Westerfield, Branch Banking: Its Historical and 
Theoretical Position in America and Abroad (New York, 1942); Milton Friedman and Anna J. 
Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States (Princeton, 1963); Eugene N. White, The 
Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, 1900-1929 (Princeton, 1983); Charles W. 
Calomiris, R. Glenn Hubbard, and James T. Stock, "The Farm Debt Crisis and Public Policy," 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1986); and Calomiris and Schweikart, "The Panic of 
1857." 
7 Again, see Golembe, "Deposit Insurance Legislation." 
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toward creating government insurance funds. All six antebellum states 
that enacted liability insurance were unit-banking states. In the antebel- 
lum branch-banking South neither government insurance, nor urban 
clearinghouses, developed. Similarly, the eight state insurance systems 
created from 1908 to 1917 were all in unit-banking states. 
In evaluating the performance of the various government-created 
liability-insurance schemes below, I ask two principal questions: First, 
which experiments failed or succeeded, and why? Here I am particu- 
larly interested in ascertaining whether the failures of insurance systems 
were attributable to flaws inherent in their design, or to insurmountable 
exogenous shocks. And second, would allowing branch banking (the 
perceived alternative to insurance) have provided a more effective 
means to protect the payments system than bank insurance?8 
ANTEBELLUM SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 
New York's Safety Fund was established in 1829, funded by limited 
annual contributions of members and regulated by the state govern- 
ment. Losses severely depleted the accumulated resources of the fund 
from 1837 to 1841 until, in 1842, it ceased to be able to repay losses of 
failed banks and thus ceased to provide protection to the payments 
system. 
New York in 1838 created an alternative to the insured system 
through its free banking statute, and allowed Safety-Fund banks to 
switch to that system. The depletion in membership of the insured 
system kept its losses small during subsequent panics. After 1840 
Safety-Fund banks comprised a small and continually shrinking propor- 
tion of total banks or total bank assets. Losses were also limited by the 
1842 restriction on coverage of member banks' liabilities to bank notes, 
thus excluding the growing liability base in deposits. 
Ultimately the small number of banks that chose to remain in the 
system and make continuing annual contributions to its fund did manage 
to repay in 1866 the obligations incurred some thirty years earlier, but 
this "success" was not anticipated in the intervening years (as shown 
by the high note discount rates attached to failed member-banks' notes 
during the 1850s), and the fund did not protect current bank liabilities or 
the payments system ex ante, as it was intended to do. 
Not only did the system fail to provide protection to the payments 
system, it suffered unusually large losses due to fraud or unsound 
banking practices. While a supervisory authority was established to 
8 This article summarizes and extends the analysis presented in Charles W. Calomiris, "Deposit 
Insurance: Lessons from the Record," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
13 (May/June 1989), and "Do Vulnerable Economies Need Deposit Insurance? Lessons from the 
U.S. Agricultural Boom and Bust of the 1920s," in Philip Brock, ed., If Texas Were Chile: 
Financial Risk and Regulation in Commodity-Exporting Economies (Washington, DC, 1990). 
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prevent fraud and excessive risk-taking, supervision was ineffectual, and 
fraud or unsafe practices were common. Ten of 16 member-bank failures 
prior to 1842 (the period when insurance was still perceived as effective) 
were traceable to fraud or unsafe practices. Moreover, such problems were 
not detected until after they had imposed large losses on the fund. 
The failure of the Safety Fund was not the fault of external shocks, 
severe as they were. In aggregate, banking capital was large relative to 
losses, and thus coinsurance among all New York banks would have 
been feasible. Rather it was the design of the insurance system that 
made it weak.9 Upper bounds on annual premia prevented adequate ex 
ante insurance during panics, and ineffectual supervision allowed large 
risk-takers to free ride on other banks. Finally, adverse selection caused 
a retreat from the system through charter-switching to the alternative 
free-banking system once solvent banks realized the extent of losses. 
Vermont and Michigan followed New York's example and suffered its 
problems. In Vermont, banks were even allowed to join and depart at 
will. It took only two bank failures-one due to fraud and the other 
because it joined the system after its prospects had deteriorated-to 
cause the dissolution of that system. Again, an incentive-compatible, 
broadly based system could have provided coinsurance among banks, 
but adverse selection and poor supervision prevented this. 
Michigan's system, created in 1836, collapsed because it like the 
other two systems depended for its resources on accumulated contri- 
butions to the collective fund, which would be used to support banks 
during a crisis. The Michigan system had not time to accumulate a 
sufficient fund prior to the Panics of 1837 and 1839 and thus was unable 
to provide protection. 
Not all antebellum experiments ended so disastrously. Indiana en- 
acted a different sort of liability insurance plan in 1834, one based on the 
principles of self-regulation and unlimited mutual liability that would 
later be imitated by private clearinghouses. The Indiana system did not 
suffer the supervisory laxity or membership retreat of New York and 
Vermont, nor the illiquidity of Michigan and New York. Coverage was 
broad-based and there was no problem attracting and keeping members. 
During its 30-year history no insured bank failed. The system suspended 
convertibility in 1837, and again in 1839, but this was the last time banks 
were even forced to suspend. During the regional panic of 1854-1855 
and the national Panic of 1857 all insured banks maintained operations 
and convertibility. During those same panics 69 of 126 nonmember, 
uncoordinated free banks failed in Indiana. 
9 For quantitative evidence on losses relative to bank capital for New York and other 
antebellum states, see Carter H. Golembe and Clark S. Warburton, Insurance of Bank Obligations 
in Six States During the Period 1829-1866 (monograph, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
1958). 
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The Indiana insurance system relied on bankers themselves to make 
and enforce laws and regulations through a Board of Directors and, 
importantly, gave the board authority to decide when to close a bank. 
Unlimited mutual liability provided bankers the incentive to regulate 
and enforce properly. The Indiana system was imitated in Ohio and 
Iowa, with similarly successful results. Ohio's law granted its Board of 
Control even greater authority than Indiana's board, allowing it virtu- 
ally unlimited discretionary powers during a banking crisis, including 
the right to force banks to make loans to one another. Interbank loans 
were successfully used during the Panic of 1857 to avoid suspension of 
convertibility. The insured banks, it seems, even came to the assistance 
of nonmember banks during the Panic, as indicated by flows of 
interbank loans. Only one Ohio bank failed during the crisis, and it was 
not a member of the insured system. Iowa's system was in place for a 
shorter and more stable period, but its operation was similarly successful. 
Like clearinghouses, these three successful insurance schemes 
aligned the incentive and authority to regulate and made insurance 
protection credible through unlimited mutual liability among banks. 
Like Southern branch banks in the Panics of 1837 and 1857, these 
systems were able to minimize systemic disruption through a coordi- 
nated, incentive-compatible response. They were brought to an end not 
by insolvency, but by federal taxation of bank notes designed to 
promote the National Banking System. 
THE SECOND, POSTBELLUM WAVE OF STATE INSURANCE 
The eight deposit-insurance fund systems of the early twentieth 
century failed to learn the lessons of the antebellum experience; they 
repeated and compounded the earlier errors of New York, Vermont, 
and Michigan. Supervisory authority was placed in government, not 
member-bank, hands, and often its use or disuse was politically moti- 
vated.10 Furthermore, the numbers of banks insured were many more 
than in the antebellum systems (often several hundred), and this further 
reduced a bank's incentive to monitor and report the misbehavior of its 
neighbor banks, since the payoff from detection was shared with so 
many, and the cost of monitoring was private. 
During the halcyon days for agriculture, from 1914 to 1920, deposit 
insurance prompted unusually high growth, particularly of small rural 
banks on thin capital. The insured states' banks grew faster, were 
smaller, and had lower capital ratios than their state-chartered counter- 
parts in fast-growing, or neighboring states. Tables 1, 2, and 3 compare 
the growth, average size, and capitalization of insured state-chartered 
banking systems, first by comparing the highest-growth insured and 
10 For examples, see Thomas B. Robb, The Guaranty of Bank Deposits (New York, 1921). 
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TABLE 1 
HIGH-GROWTH STATES: INSURED VERSUS UNINSURED 
Proportion of Assets 
in 1914 to Assets in Assets per Bank, 1920 Ratio of Capital to 
1920 ($ thousands) Total Assets, 1920 
National State National State National State 
Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
Uninsured 
Arkansas 0.408 0.379 $1,020 $456 0.084 0.085 
Colorado 0.522 0.450 1,069 460 0.081 0.083 
Idaho 0.341 0.316 1,088 487 0.059 0.088 
Iowa 0.507 0.503 1,301 562 0.057 0.104 
Minnesota 0.509 0.406 1,979 425 0.054 0.069 
Missouri 0.490 0.540 5,507 572 0.063 0.072 
Montana 0.495 0.489 761 436 0.077 0.091 
New Mexico 0.501 0.352 963 347 0.073 0.119 
Wyoming 0.314 0.315 1,365 300 0.048 0.090 
Average 0.454 0.418 1,673 448 0.066 0.090 
Insured 
Kansas 0.463 0.380 977 326 0.066 0.079 
Mississippi 0.506 0.335 1,843 664 0.069 0.066 
Nebraska 0.537 0.335 1,566 335 0.057 0.082 
North Dakota 0.485 0.367 563 248 0.068 0.081 
Oklahoma 0.309 0.259 1,096 346 0.126 0.070 
South Dakota 0.400 0.351 862 376 0.053 0.062 
Texas 0.414 0.391 1,588 375 0.071 0.112 
Average 0.447 0.344 1,231 389 0.073 0.078 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, All Bank Statistics (Washington, DC, 
1959). 
uninsured systems, and then by comparing insured-banking systems 
with neighboring uninsured state-chartered systems and uninsured 
national-chartered banking in each of the states. Table 3 reports 
regression results that confirm the unusually high growth of state- 
chartered insured banks (controlling for other variables) relative to 
other agricultural states. A decomposition among voluntary and com- 
pulsory state insurance systems reveals that the incentives to grow were 
especially pronounced in the compulsory insurance systems (where the 
potential for cross-subsidization,. or free riding through excessive risk- 
taking, was highest). 
When agricultural prices fell, insured banking systems suffered higher 
rates of decline and failure than uninsured state-chartered banks in 
agricultural states and showed an even greater difference in the asset 
shortfalls (relative to deposits) of insolvent banks. All the insurance 
fund systems collapsed during the 1920s.11 Insured systems also saw 
" For summaries of the specific historical experiences, see American Bankers Association, The 
Guaranty of Bank Deposits (New York, 1933), and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual 
Report (Washington, DC, 1956). 
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TABLE 2 
STATE-CHARTERED REGIONAL COMPARISON: INSURED VERSUS UNINSURED 
Ratio of Assets in 
1914 to Assets in Assets per Bank, 1920 Ratio of Capital to 
1920 ($ thousands) Total Assets, 1920 
Uninsured 
Arkansas 0.379 $456 0.085 
Colorado 0.450 460 0.083 
Iowa 0.503 562 0.067 
Idaho 0.316 487 0.077 
Minnesota 0.406 425 0.069 
Missouri 0.540 572 0.072 
Montana 0.489 436 0.091 
New Mexico 0.352 347 0.119 
Wyoming 0.315 300 0.090 
Average 0.418 448 0.084 
Insured 
Kansas 0.380 326 0.079 
North Dakota 0.367 248 0.081 
Nebraska 0.335 335 0.082 
Oklahoma 0.259 346 0.070 
South Dakota 0.351 376 0.062 
Texas 0.391 375 0.112 
Average 0.347 334 0.081 
Uninsured 
Alabama 0.553 543 0.087 
Georgia 0.412 534 0.097 
South Carolina 0.390 536 0.085 
Average 0.452 538 0.090 
Insured 
Mississippi 0.335 664 0.066 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, All Bank Statistics (Washington, DC, 
1959). 
greater delays in closing and liquidating insolvent banks, reminiscent of 
politically motivated delays during the current thrift crisis. 12 
The three states that had long-lived, free-entry, compulsory deposit 
insurance (which provided the worst and most prolonged incentives for 
risk-taking) experienced the most drastic losses by far among the state- 
and national-chartered systems. While several state-chartered systems 
experienced comparable shocks to these three (North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Nebraska), in no other cases were the asset shortfalls of 
insolvent banks nearly large enough to threaten the capital of the 
banking system as a whole (see Table 4). In contrast, these three states 
showed shortfalls of between 1.5 and 5 times remaining bank equity of 
state banks. 
12 Detailed evidence on each of these points is provided in Calomiris, "U.S. Agricultural Boom 
and Bust." 
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TABLE 3 
REGRESSION RESULTS: EARLY ASSET GROWTH OF STATE-CHARTERED BANKS' 
a. Dependent variable: Growth in total assets of state-chartered banks, 1914-1920 
Standard Significance 
Independent Variables Coefficient Error Level 
Intercept 0.156 0.468 0.741 
National bank growth 0.682 0.147 0.000 
Reserve center times national bank growth -0.115 0.063 0.080 
Growth in land values, 1914-1920 0.526 0.334 0.127 
Ratio of farm to non-farm population -0.328 0.655 0.621 
Presence of voluntary insurance 0.327 0.251 0.205 
Presence of compulsory insurance 0.609 0.189 0.004 
R2- 0.683 
R2 - 0.607 
b. Dependent variable: Growth in total assets of state-chartered banks, 1914-1920 
Standard Significance 
Independent Variables Coefficient Error Level 
Intercept 0.101 0.465 0.829 
National bank growth 0.681 0.147 0.000 
Reserve center times national bank growthb -0.132 0.060 0.038 
Growth in land values, 1914-1920 0.555 0.333 0.107 
Ratio of farm to non-farm population -0.283 0.654 0.669 
Presence of voluntary or compulsory insurance 0.518 0.165 0.004 
R2= 0.670 
R2 0.607 
a Asset growth is defined as the log difference of total assets. All variables are defined at the state 
level for a sample of 32 agricultural states. 
b National bank growth in each state is used as a control for state-chartered bank growth. In 
reserve-center states, national bank growth may be larger, as it reflects growth of correspondent 
banks outside of the state as well. To control for this difference, I interact national banking growth 
with an indicator variable for states with reserve centers. 
Source: Charles W. Calomiris, "Do Vulnerable Economies Need Deposit Insurance?" in Philip 
Brock, ed., If Texas Were Chile: Financial Risk and Regulation in Commodity-Exporting 
Economies (Washington, DC, 1990). 
CONTRASTING THE PERFORMANCE OF INSURED AND BRANCH BANKING 
The failings of deposit insurance systems stand in sharp contrast to 
their perceived political alternative, branch banking. States that allowed 
branch banking saw much lower failure rates-reflecting the unusually 
high survivability of branching banks-and responded well to the 
agricultural crisis by consolidating banks and expanding branching 
systems, where this was allowed. 
From 1921 to 1929 only 37 branching banks failed in the United 
States, almost all of which operated only one or two branches. Branch- 
ing failures were only 4 percent of branch-banking facilities, almost an 
order of magnitude less than the failure rate of unit banks for this period. 
In states hard hit by the agricultural crisis, branch banks' failure rates 
were roughly a fourth those of unit banks. In Arizona, Mississippi, and 
South Carolina-three hard-hit states with existing statewide branching 
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networks-existing branches survived especially well, and new entry 
into banking (allowed only in Arizona and South Carolina) was espe- 
cially strong. 13 
Table 5 reports regression results on bank growth from 1920 to 1926 
and 1920 to 1930. States that permitted expansion of branching saw 
substantially higher (and statistically significant) asset growth relative to 
other states, controlling for other influences. A comparison across the 
two time periods shows that the influence of branching persisted and 
grew stronger with the passage of time. The effect of the presence of 
deposit insurance was negative, but this mainly reflected a temporary 
retreat from the state systems until after the insurance laws were 
repealed. By 1930 previously insured state systems had recovered to 
roughly the same levels of assets as other unit-banking state systems. 
Contemporaries often remarked on the unusual survivability and 
growth of branch banks in the face of the crisis. Many states altered 
their branch banking laws in response to these observations. From 1924 to 
1939 the number of full or limited branch-banking states rose from 18 to 36. 
Four of the 8 states that previously had opted for deposit insurance were 
among those liberalizing their branching restrictions during this period. 
CONCLUSION 
I conclude that unlimited branch banking, combined with the sort of 
privately administered insurance programs of antebellum Indiana, Ohio, 
and Iowa, would have been adequate to protect the payments system 
from exogenous disturbances that could produce banking panics. 14 The 
greatest threats to systemic stability historically were unit banking and 
ill-conceived attempts to promote stability through government-con- 
trolled insurance, which actually produced quite the opposite effect by 
promoting excessive risk-taking. 
The problems of moral hazard and adverse selection which arise in 
government deposit insurance systems are likely to be even more 
pronounced in today's federal insurance programs. The state insurance 
systems of the 1920s limited interest paid on deposits, typically required 
ratios of capital to deposits in excess of 10 percent, and were funded by 
the accumulated contributions of members. Today's federal insurance 
plans do not restrict interest payments to depositors, require a trivial 
proportion of capital to deposits, and are supported by the full faith and 
credit of the federal government. Thus today's financial intermediaries 
can maintain higher leverage and attract depositors more easily by 
offering higher rates of return with virtually no risk of default. From this 
13 Again, for more detailed evidence, see ibid. 
14 The collapse of the 1930s demonstrates, of course, that if government policy makers want to 
destroy a banking system (in that case through deflation and monetary contraction) they have the 
power to do so. 
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TABLE 5 
REGRESSION RESULTS: LATE ASSET GROWTH AND BANK SIZE OF 
STATE-CHARTERED BANKa 
a. Dependent Variable: Growth in total assets of state-chartered banks, 1920-1926 
Standard Significance 
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Level 
Intercept 0.544 0.450 0.239 
National bank growth 0.602 0.235 0.018 
Reserve center times national bank growth 0.178 0.098 0.084 
Ratio of farm to non-farm population -0.404 0.346 0.254 
Growth in land values, 1920-1925 0.037 0.541 0.946 
Business failure rate, 1921-1925/ 
_0.040 0.038 0.308 
Business failure rate, 1917-1920 0 
Presence of deposit insurance (excluding -0.190 0.126 0.146 
Nebraska)c 
Out-of-city branch banking 0.179 0.124 0.163 
Within-city branch bankingd 0.204 0.132 0.136 
R2 = 0.601 
R2 = 0.462 
b. Dependent Variable: Growth in total assets of state-chartered banks, 1920-1930 
Standard Significance 
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Level 
Intercept 1.539 0.449 0.002 
National bank growth 0.124 0.200 0.539 
Reserve center times national bank growth 0.078 0.115 0.502 
Ratio of farm to non-farm population -0.936 0.405 0.030 
Growth in land values, 1920-1930 -0.386 0.551 0.490 
Business failure rate, 1921-1929/ 
-0.072 0.044 0.118 
Business failure rate, 1917-1920 - 
Presence of deposit insurance (excluding -0.065 0.140 0.647 
Nebraska)c 
Out-of-city branch bankingd 0.398 0.150 0.014 
Within-city branch banking 0.428 0.161 0.014 
R2 = 0.625 
2 = 0.495 
a Asset growth is defined as the log difference of total assets. All variables are defined at the state 
level for a sample of 32 agricultural states. 
b National bank growth in each state is used as a control for state-chartered bank growth. In 
reserve-center states, national bank growth may be larger, as it reflects growth of correspondent 
banks outside of the state, as well. To control for this difference, I interact national banking growth 
with an indicator variable for states with reserve centers. 
c Nebraska's insured banks remained open long after they were known to be insolvent. Thus data 
for Nebraska on total assets of state-chartered banks overstate actual state-chartered bank assets 
for the 1920s. For this reason Nebraska was excluded from the group of insured states in these 
regressions. 
d The indicator variable for out-of-city branching takes a value of 1 for states that allowed 
branching outside the home city of the bank, 0 otherwise. The within-city indicator takes a value 
of 1 for states that allowed branching only within a bank's home city, 0 otherwise. 
Source: Charles W. Calomiris, "Do Vulnerable Economies Need Deposit Insurance?" in Philip 
Brock, ed., If Texas Were Chile: Financial Risk and Regulation in Commodity-Exporting 
Economies (Washington, DC, 1990). 
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perspective the unprecedented losses of Texas banks and thrifts in the 
1980s should come as no surprise. 
Reformers of current deposit insurance plans might apply the lessons 
of the successful antebellum insurance programs by creating a greater 
role for incentive-compatible self-regulation and coinsurance among 
banks. Today's futures clearinghouses, which regulate members' risks 
and provide incentive-compatible liquidity coinsurance, also success- 
fully apply this principle. 
A role remains for the government, however, in regulating bank 
insurance programs. At the very least the government should ensure 
freedom of entry into coinsuring groups of banks and competition 
among groups (by creating, for example, separate groups that overlap 
geographically). In a unit-banking scenario, the need for many groups 
(to keep group size small enough to encourage monitoring) dictates 
special attention to potential problems of local market monopolization. 
In contrast, today's futures clearinghouses can rely on national, and 
soon international, competition to limit the power of any group. 
One might also argue, notwithstanding the evidence from the 1920s 
reported here, that government should provide some stop-gap protec- 
tion against systemic collapse of the banking system-that is, shocks 
greater than those that could be absorbed by bank capital. To this end 
the government might establish an insurance plan with a "deductible." 
For example, coinsurance among banks would be relied on entirely for 
reimbursing depositors of the first banks that failed; the government 
would share increasingly in subsequent losses of failed banks. This 
would provide the incentives for interbank discipline and for market 
discipline of banking coalitions as a whole without risking systemic 
collapse.15 Moreover, since it is likely that the government will inter- 
vene in such crises even without an explicit commitment to do so, it 
would be best to have that commitment spelled out. This would limit 
Congressional intervention to serve constituents' interests. 
Absent the political feasibility of fully self-regulating, coinsuring 
groups of banks, some smaller steps could be taken to reduce the costs 
of government deposit insurance by enlisting the assistance of banks in 
the supervision process.16 For example, banks could be assigned to 
groups, and banks within a group could be penalized (with higher 
insurance premia) for failing to detect and report violations or insol- 
vency of other banks in the group. At the very least this would provide 
a strong counterbalance to political encouragement of excessive "for- 
bearance" by creating an interest group that would have an incentive to 
monitor banks and "blow the whistle" early on insolvent institutions. 
15 I thank Henning Bohn for suggesting this to me. 
16 I thank Peter Diamond for suggesting the usefulness of state-contingent insurance premia in 
limited supervisory banking coalitions. 
